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“First, Do No Harm….”: An exploratory critique of

“Disaster Grant making, A Practical Guide for Foundations and Corporations”

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Abstract

The European Foundations Centre (EFC) and Council on Foundation’s (CoF) 2001 disaster grantmaking ‘Guide’ is a unique and recently much-cited document, in support of grantmakers. This paper offers an exploratory critique of the ‘Guide’ in the context of developing debates concerning disaster grantmaking opportunities, operations and outcomes. Changing understandings of the nature of “disaster” are examined and the directions of academic and practitioner publication reviewed. The innovative EFC/CoF Guide is then considered. Four core assumptions regarding grantmakers are identified - their existing knowledge and skills, their capacity and time, their ability to maintain rational approaches under pressure, and the predominance of their reactive approach to working with large international NGOs focused on natural disaster situations. These are critiqued and insufficiencies, such as lack of emphasis on risk analysis, are suggested. Extending grantmakers’ understanding of what constitutes “a disaster” is regarded as critical, drawing on various perspectives such as the ‘Good Humanitarian Donor Initiative’ and a 2005 case example from Malawi. Parallel developments in creating hybrid organisations from existing grantmakers to respond to disasters are also considered, drawing on the temporary creation of the ‘September 11th Foundation’ in New York. Finally, the paper reflects on the fundamental strategic management challenges to grantmakers posed by the ‘Guide’, the feasibility of developing tailored ‘toolkits’ for grantmaking organisations of varying size, and future research directions, includes ways of theorising disaster grantmaking.

Introduction

In the wake of the global tsunami disaster of December 2004, Western and Northern grantmaking organisations and corporate donors seeking expert material on involvement would have found that “all roads lead to Rome”. “Rome” in this case was the “Guide to Disaster Grantmaking”, published jointly in 2001 by the European Foundations Centre and the US Council on Foundations. Philanthropic and corporate social responsibility websites across the UK and Europe, Canada and the United States cited this succinct, specialist document as the crucial document for grantmakers in such pressurised situations; indeed as the only guide of its kind. What then is ‘disaster grantmaking’? What are its rationales and core principles, as articulated by the Guide? To what extent does the Guide offer multiple or single routes to disaster grantmaking opportunities and operations, as ‘ideal’ or ‘real’ models for action? What kinds and sizes of grantmakers does the Guide focus on? Are disaster grantmakers perceived as dynamic, cautious or having some judicious mixture of both? What kinds of risks are faced and understood by disaster grantmakers? Why, where and how does disaster grantmaking differ from – or can learn from – international development grantmaking, or grantmaking more widely, over the longer term? What are the implications for grantmaking outcomes of the predominance of Western and Northern based approaches to disaster grantmaking?

This paper begins an examination of these questions. It commences with a brief overview of the developing literature on disasters and disaster management and of conceptual frameworks that delineate ways in which disaster based operations by organisations and institutions can be
understood. Its core is an exploratory critique of the *Guide*, which draws on practitioner and academic analysis of its aims, contents, advocacy and messages. It continues by considering perspectives in the *Guide* to linked and subsequent international work: for instance, on the core principles of the Good Humanitarian Donor Initiative. The paper explores links between disaster grantmaking and long(er) term development or wider grant making approaches. Its conclusions reflect on the strategic management implications and demands of disaster grantmaking by organisations of all sizes, and on future research directions. These directions include consideration of the implications of Western and Northern-dominated interpretations of “disaster grantmaking” policy and practice for grantmakers.

**The developing literatures on ‘disasters’ and ‘disaster management’**

The literatures in development studies, social policy and sociology, management and business studies, environmental studies, engineering, demography, urban planning, medicine, public health, international relations, defence studies and economics, among others, make complex contributions to understanding in the field of ‘disasters’ and ‘disasters management’. In the United States, the social aspects of natural and technological disasters “were touched on in the early days of sociology” (International Sociological Association, n.d.). Prince’s (1920) doctoral thesis at Columbia University, on “catastrophe and social change” in the context of a combining manmade and natural disaster in Halifax, Nova Scotia is cited widely as a seminal work (ISA, ibid, Carr, 1932, Nigg and Tierney, 1993).

By 1932, Carr was arguing for a “sequence pattern concept” of disasters, and for analysis which distinguished disasters “not only on the basis of the consequences but also of (1) the character of the precipitating event and (2) the scope of the resulting cultural collapse” (op. cit, 209). On this basis, there were four types of disaster: “an instantaneous-diffused type - over before anyone could do anything about it, wreaking effects on an entire community; an instantaneous-focalised type, such as an explosion which kills or injures locally but leaves the rest of the community intact; a progressive-diffused type, such as hurricanes and floods, lasting over periods of time and affecting whole communities; finally, a progressive-focalised type, such as mine explosion or collapse, or major shipwreck. In the post-war United States, research questions in social science included those concerning the ways in which existing social systems adapt to disaster conditions, how new systems arise to meet emergencies and “how old and emergent systems respond to actual or threatened disasters”(Form et al, 1956).

Until the 1960s disaster research was undertaken in the main at scattered US academic institutions; then the first ongoing academic research operation came into being with the establishment of the Disaster Research Centre (DRC) at Ohio State University in 1963 (Quarantelli and Dynes, 1977). Subsequent developments across a range of academic institutions internationally reflect both developing and embedded scholarly themes. Current examples range from Johns Hopkins University’s Disaster and Refugees Centre (JHU, 2005); to Cranfield/RMCS’ ‘Resilience Centre’, in its Department of Defense Management and Security Analysis.
Definitions of disaster draw from a wide range of disciplines and schools of thinking; with one marked theme - the varying understandings of and inconsistency in application of the term “disaster”. Bucher (1957,469) examined how causation of a disaster becomes an issue, so that “disasters become a problem which must be unraveled” noting that “blame is considered a usual if not inevitable feature of disasters” (ibid, 469). Kreps (1984, 311) noted that “disaster is a vague term that has defied simple interpretation”, and seeks to clarify understanding since “most authors are referring to the physical impacts of or problems caused for human communities by unplanned or social disruptive events”.

Nigg and Tiervey (op.cit, 32) link variations in usage and meaning to limitations in addressing and developing a general theory of social change: “unless we are more able to define what we mean by disaster and what constitutes change, we cannot expect to make much progress in discovering how they are related”. They cite the work of Bates and Peacock (1987) which suggested restricting the term disaster to “large scale events that involve a relatively sudden and massive impact on the built environment and its inhabitants at a community or societal level – as they note, a conceptualisation that would exclude both slow-onset and some quick onset man-made events. Tierney (1993) describes four main phases of disaster activity. These are mitigation, (policies and actions taken before an event that are intended to minimise damage); preparedness, (the second line of defence against a disaster - to enhance the ability to respond when a disaster occurs); response (actions taken at the time a disaster strikes, to reduce threats to life safety, secondary hazards and losses) and recovery (efforts to reconstruct and restore the disaster stricken area; deal with disruption in community life, meet the recovery related needs of victims and mitigate future hazards.) Tierney (1993) acknowledges that the four phases may appear to be a sequence, yet they actually overlap and merge and that disaster preparedness and response are the two phases most studied by researchers.

Diverse theories of development also affect the study of disasters with McEntire (2004) arguing for integration of divergent theories, with special reference to the concept of vulnerability. Shaluf et al (2003), note that the terms ‘disaster’ and ‘crisis’ are sometimes used interchangeably and emphasise that there is “no universally available criteria to define disaster in terms of the consequences, such as casualties and the cost of damage”. Ambiguity in usage goes beyond academic concerns to governmental, donor and citizen comprehension and responses. In a parallel debate Howe and Deveruex (2004, 353) examine how disagreements on the application of the term ‘famine’ in recent humanitarian emergencies have had “tragic implications for response and accountability”. Their critique is severe and sustained: “operationally, lack of consensus on a definition has contributed to delayed interventions and inequitable distribution of resources among areas of need”(ibid, 354.) Moreover, they note studies which have questioned whether, in the absence of universal benchmarks or criteria, aid is given according to need or determined by non humanitarian considerations such as donor country interests in a given situation. They cite Watson (2002), showing how a disproportionate amount of aid went to the Kosovo crisis in 1998 at the time of the famine in Southern Sudan (op.cit, 355). From managerial and decision making perspectives Suparamaniam and Dekker (2003) examined “the central dilemma” of disaster relief work - that disaster relief workers either had the knowledge to know what to do or the authority to do it, though
seldom were the local knowledge of what to do and the authority to do it located in the same person. This leads to instability and pressures for change; with the authors presenting the concept of “renegotiations of authority”, where those not officially in charge “take responsibility to act because they know what to do and how urgent it is to do it.” (Suparamaniam and Dekker, ibid, 312)

As definitions of disaster shift, so does the literature in raising both wider social and contextual issues and in narrowing down to study events and outcomes on an individualistic human scale. Thus, Alexander, (2003), reviewing work by Palakudiyil, Todd and colleagues, emphasises that, since disasters relate to external intervention, “disasters raise serious issues of democracy and empowerment”. Enarson and Hearn Morrow (1998) advance the claim that women have largely been ignored in the social science of disasters; although in reviewing, Aguirre (2000,398) sees this work as largely “plaintive rather than suggestive of concrete well-developed ameliorative ideas”. The way in which disaster effects vary by race and ethnicity during periods of response, recovery and reconstruction, in a United States context are examined in a literature synthesis by Fothergill, Maestas and Darlington (1999). Perry and Lindell (2003) explore “citizen responses to disasters with implications for terrorism”. Birkland (1997) examines public policy and agenda setting in governments following disasters. Another author, reviewing this study, reasons that “affected communities must be organised and demand governmental response for it to occur ...but (these) communities are not those that lose their homes in a hurricane ...rather the communities of interest are professionals, experts and activists that can mobilise the technical arguments and promote a sense that some potentially world solutions exist” (Baumgartner, 1998, 516).

The European Foundation Centre and Council of Foundations Guide to Disaster Grantmaking.

The European Foundation Centre and Council on Foundations ‘Guide to disaster grantmaking, completed in late 2001, was created through a working group to inform foundations and corporate grant makers interested in becoming more effective and strategic in their disaster grant making. It sets out eight principles for good disaster grant making, provides illustrations of the experiences of grant making organisations with examples of ‘good and bad’ practices; presents disaster facts and figures and gives a list of relevant web sites. An innovative and important initiative, its text is accessible, with clear recommendations, guidance and insights.

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<th>Summary of the Guide’s eight principles:</th>
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<td>1. First do no harm</td>
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<td>2. Stop, look and listen before taking action</td>
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<td>3. Don’t act in isolation</td>
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<td>4. Think beyond the immediate crisis to the long term</td>
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<td>5. Bear in mind the expertise of local organizations</td>
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<td>6. Find out how prospectee grantees operate</td>
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<td>7. Be accountable to those you are trying to help</td>
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<td>8. Communicate your work widely and use it as an education tool</td>
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Notwithstanding the practical and positive nature of this welcome initiative, it can be reasoned that the Guide is reduced in its usefulness in two main ways: firstly, because of four key assumptions that emerge from this exploratory review that are not adequately addressed in the text; secondly, because it can be contested that the Guide fails to give sufficient contextual information and analysis of major issues related to disaster grant making.

The four assumptions are firstly, that grant makers have a relatively high level of knowledge and skill; secondly, that grant making organisations have significant capacity, particularly human resources and time; thirdly, that grant making organisations can adopt a rational, planned and strategic approach in the face of the pressure to respond to disasters; and fourthly, that grant making organisations will tend to respond to natural disasters through larger international NGOs in a reactive way. It can be argued that the first two of these assumptions are the most important of the four and that they are addressed insufficiently in the Guide. There are some helpful nuances in the narrative about issues pertaining to the last two assumptions. The basis for making these assertions and their implications are now explored in this paper.

Understanding ‘disaster’

The Guide states that the concept of disaster encompasses natural events such as earthquakes, cyclones, volcanic eruptions, fires and floods, but also more complex emergencies that result in widespread human suffering like famine, civil conflict, and acts of terrorism. It does not give a definition of disasters though acknowledges that over the past fifty years there has been a significant evolution in thinking about disasters; here, the debate shifting from the narrow concept of providing quick disaster relief based on a charitable impulse to a broader concept of disaster management that encompasses community involvement in mitigation, prevention and preparedness, emergency relief, rehabilitation as well as long term development that incorporates both prevention and preparedness. The Guide reasons that integrating disaster prevention with long-term development is seen as the most effective way of saving lives and protecting livelihoods.

Whilst this paper broadly concurs with the Guide’s view of how these concepts have developed, an interpretation of these key terms, if not a single definition, or series of alternative definitions, is looked for, to assist the grantmaker. For example, an approach following Tierney’s differentiation (op.cit) might be useful. The degree to which her ‘four stages’ can be separated meaningfully from wider social and development issues and the ongoing reality in some countries will also be explored later in this paper, with the current situation in Malawi given as an illustration of the factors involved, and as a contrast to the implicit understanding of ‘disaster’ within the Guide.

Also some greater sense of the historical context, and the nature of the international debates and learning that has led to the evolution in conceptual and practice thinking, would be helpful. Such background would provide grant makers with a solid foundation for considering the principles and recommendations that follow in the Guide. Moreover the guide does not set out at the outset a case for why disaster grant making might reasonably be considered in a different light from any
other form of grant making to organisations with “radical” social or other types of programmes -
even un-radical ones! Thus the reader is not briefed on the rationale for the Guide in the first
place: i.e., is there anything wrong with grant making practice – why does it need to be improved
and is there an external context driving this?

Assumption one – the knowledge and skills of Grantmakers

An assumption emerges that grantmakers would tend to already - and uniformly - have relatively
high levels of knowledge and skills. It is important to illustrate this since it can be reasoned to be a
major shortcoming of the Guide. For instance, the Guide recommends that a “disaster plan” is
formed, that “internal guidelines and criteria” are set, that people will be able to obtain knowledge
about situations where “donated services can be helpful so long as they do not duplicate services”;
that Grant makers will understand what it means to “fill important gaps between relief and
development”; that they will have the skills to “consider making grants on root causes of specific
disasters”; that they will have knowledge about how to “strengthen local organisational capacity”;
that they will have relevant background about “checking to see if organisations subscribe to one of
international codes of conduct or standards for disaster response”. At an operational level the
Guide assumes that grant makers will know already about the intricacies of transferring funds
effectively and safely internationally, in disaster situations. It assumes that people will understand
the nuances of why “cash assistance is nearly always preferable”.

The Guide argues that: “proper grant monitoring is an essential tool to ensure grant maker
accountability”, yet does not give information about this. Even more challenging it stresses the
importance of “assessing the social impact of the grant” without giving an insight into how in testing
circumstances this might – or even should - be done. The Guide could provide information and
analysis of criteria already drawn up. For instance, Quarantelli (1997) set out ten criteria for
evaluating the management of community disasters, though questioned the suitability of these to
the developing world, given they were derived from research mainly in developed countries:

Drawing these threads together, from an overall strategic management perspective, the Guide
recommends that “after finding out about priority needs, see what areas are being funded by other
donors so that you can identify gaps that need filling”. Like much of the Guide this is common
sense; a point that few people could reasonably disagree with. However, to achieve the
aspirations of this simple sentence, in the fluid and complex context of responding to a disaster, a
high degree of skills and knowledge is required and there is no treatment of this issue in the text.
This could lead the reader of a small to medium sized non specialist grant making organisation to
the view, that this Guide is targeted only at large or specialist organisations which already have in
place people with the necessary skills and knowledge. Extending this point further, it might lead
such an organisation to think better of becoming involved in grant making in disaster situations.

The question of priority needs and ‘gap filling’ is especially critical where it implies this knowledge
is held by others and only needs to be appropriately accessed. It is far from the case that
assumptions can be made about needs being adequately identified in the first place. A Save The
Children UK (SCF UK, 2004) paper, “Missing the Point”, reviewed an analysis of interventions in
the Great Lakes Region of Africa focused on seven case studies of International NGO emergency responses in different countries and different types of emergencies during the past five years. The report concluded that:

“The same stereotyped interventions are being used, largely because these responses are not based on an understanding of the real needs of people, and insufficient attempts have been made to find out what those needs might be. Many responses were based on questionable and untested assumptions, were plagued by logical inconsistencies, and provided poor value for money…. that many food security interventions have failed to address the needs of people affected by the crises.”

In short, international organisations with teams deployed in the countries affected, that might normally be considered to be experts in this domain, are struggling with the most fundamental disaster grant making basic - ensuring needs are identified appropriately and responded to effectively. Grantmakers need not to be deluded that this is a relatively structured, knowledge-tracking task; but also to appreciate that partial ‘failure’ in this respect may well be likely, given the very partial knowledge that is held and understanding that is developed.

In general, an insight into the realities or problems that even experienced disaster response organisations face when responding to disasters is lacking in the Guide. Even where skills and knowledge are in place, problems can still occur; raising grant makers awareness of this would be helpful. Suparamaniam and Dekker's (2003) case for the need for “renegotiated authority”, given that local knowledge of what to do and the authority to do it are seldom located in the same person is a case in point.

**Assumption two: Capacity of Grantmakers**

In a similar vein the Guide seems to assume that grant making organisations have already significant capacity in place, especially regarding the availability of time and people to dedicate to responding to a disaster. For instance, the Guide recommends that it is important “not to make assumptions”, that “a professional assessment of disaster” needs to be undertaken. This assumes both that grant makers will have the time and resources to make professional assessment directly and manage and absorb the recommendations coming from this process. The Guide encourages grant makers to “explore various options for channelling support” to “find out which grant makers are responding to a disaster and what they are funding by participating in existing disaster information sharing networks and online bulletin boards” again seeming to tip the balance of involvement towards relatively large and specialist bodies. Whether or not small and medium sized, non-specialist grantmakers can become meaningfully engaged can be debated: the point here is that Guide does not seem to be conscious of the signals it might send in this respect.

**Assumption three: Adoption of a rational, planned approach by Grantmakers**

The Guide assumes that it will be possible for a more rational, planned approach to be adopted and is targeted at grant makers who wish to become more “strategic and effective”. However, if
there was ever a case for Mintzberg's (1994) contention that much of strategic management reality is driven by emergent, non rational approaches that lead to “ready, fire, aim” (rather than “ready, aim, fire”), it could be reasoned that disaster grantmaking would be one. After all, as Tierney (1993) points out, if a situation could be handled through routine organisational operations and standard procedures, and if all its details could be planned out beforehand, it would not be a disaster! In these circumstances the need to wrestle to determine solid general principles of good disaster planning is not new: for instance, see Quarantelli (1982, op. cit.). More fundamentally, this matter does not of course apply to disaster situations only. Helmuth von Moltke Snr reasoned that no plan survives contact with the enemy; Harry Truman explained that while some questions cannot be answered, they can all be decided. As Quarantelli (1988) reasoned in relation to the Truman quotation, in disaster situations, it may not be possible to answer all the questions, but it is necessary to make decisions; thus decisions are made and action is taken even if plans need to be adapted substantially in light of changing circumstances. The intense pressures and constraints in adopting such an approach are therefore not dealt with in the Guide. Neither are the international cross-cultural challenges of adopting a largely Northern or Western perspectives to the disasters grant making process, even when, at a wider strategic management level, these factors have been found to be important in decision making processes (Trompenaars, 1993), let alone it being a central consideration for the debate about the evolution of approaches towards international development (for instance, reference Chambers, 1982, 1996).

The Guide recommends that grant makers “consider supporting disaster prevention” and “consider splitting grants (immediate relief plus recovery) plus “consider linking to long term development”. Apart from the knowledge and skills assumption in this, dealt with above, this appears to assume that grant makers and their stakeholders will not be emotionally, passionately and/or intuitively engaged with the need to respond immediately and focus on relief responses only as a result. As commented upon by a grant maker (personal communication with Williams) whose organisation did not respond during the intense initial period after the December 2004 Tsunami, holding a firm line in these circumstances can be challenging. This is not least because of massive media coverage and huge outpouring of spontaneous generosity in some disaster circumstances that can understandably lead grant makers to follow “like sheep” in reacting immediately and intuitively; See Benthall (1997) for work on disasters and the media. It is easy to argue for a balanced, reasonable approach, but very difficult for grant makers in practice, when feeling overwhelmed with an avalanche of information about a disaster, to anticipate the full implications of directing funds immediately; as well as how this might impact on other organisations which they fund. For instance, The Third Sector magazine reported over seven weeks after the Tsunami, 16th February 2005, that many charities, not involved with the Tsunami, were experiencing donation falls, apparently because of Tsunami appeal giving.

In drawing the threads together, this paper would concur with the view of Quarantelli (1988) that it is usually impossible ahead of time to spell out in detail the particular tactics that have to be used. It is therefore important for grant makers to understand when reaching decisions on disasters response, that alongside the development of general strategies to be followed in a sudden emergency, the effective management of the specific situation will, to a considerable extent,
involve the application of tactics that are relevant to situational contingencies. In many respects, this is in line with the general development of strategic management literature internationally.

Thus there is a case for further investigation and development of the concept of strategic management in disaster situations and for the development of an appropriate and practical toolkit that will follow from this for grant makers and grant beneficiaries who implement programmes.

**Assumption four: Grantmaking approach – working with NGOs, governments**

The Guide would seem to assume that grant makers tend to target bigger INGOs (International Non Governmental Organisations) and respond predominantly in a somewhat reactive way to natural disasters. For instance, the Guide encourages readers to “consider looking beyond obvious choices to smaller indigenous organisations” and helpfully points out that these are “often vital in disaster response”. The guide would seem to assume a focus on natural disaster grant making when suggesting that grant makers “don’t overlook grants to organisations working on conflict resolution or supporting the care of refugees displaced by war”.

By focusing attention in the way that it does, the Guide is not highlighting the key other actors and perspectives that are crucial in the decision making melting pot: for instance, the role of the military and UN plus the role of various governments internationally in responding to disaster situations. The reader could draw the assumption that the Guide is recommending that action through NGOs, in one form or another, is most appropriate and it does not seriously tackle alternatives for the grant maker. Recent work for the UK’s Department for International Development (2004), examining institutional roles in ‘poverty reduction in difficult environments’, emphasises alternative primary “service providers” in functional and dysfunctional states. Given that disasters occur in both functional and dysfunctional states, it might be helpful for the Guide to pick up the issue of the propriety of grantmakers considering different channels in different situations. For instance, where responding to a disaster via a government agency might make considerable sense in one situation, it could be completely inappropriate in another.

It could be reasoned then that the Guide has embraced rather too closely the management acronym “KISS” - Keep It Simple Stupid. In doing this it runs the danger of being ineffective, through being too superficial on important points; an approached characterised by its important opening principle, that is left unexplored in any detail - “First, do no harm”. From the discussion of the four challenging assumptions emerging from this exploratory review of the guide, discussed above, three further salient points emerge.

**Alternative means of directing disaster grantmaking?**

Firstly, there is insufficient analysis of the practical advantages and disadvantages of directing disaster grant making policy in particular ways. For instance, the pros and cons of responding to disasters where a grant maker already has programmes and partners in place; responding through strategic relationships; responding to situations where short, medium to long term planning horizons are in place (or not in place as the case might be). A pragmatic analysis of some of these
issues might be highly beneficial, especially from a risk management perspective. For instance, an international grant maker that focuses its work only in countries where it works with existing partners and under the umbrella of a strategic set of relationships that span the continuum from emergency mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery to sustainable development may well face lower risks when responding to a particular disaster than a organisation that decides to respond reactively with no previous relevant experience in the country and with no existing relationships with partners. Properly examining issues involved with such an example would seem to be a basic necessity rather than a luxury in a Guide like this. Specifically, relationships is an important word that could usefully be explored: for instance, as well as the quality of proposed disaster response initiatives, underlying issues to do with the relationship with the potential grant recipient organization - such as trust and confidence - are oftentimes key ingredients in a decision making process. Ultimately grant makers will want to ensure that any funding committed makes the greatest impact possible and a risk analysis of options, whether consciously labeled as such, will underpin decision making. The Guide’s absence of significant analysis on this is a key oversight, especially given what could be argued to be the relatively high risks involved with this form of grant generally.

Challenges in ‘identifying the gaps’ and responding effectively?

Secondly, the Guide appears insufficiently rigorous in analysing examples of good and bad practice and informing readers of why this is the case. Much of the Guide (15 of 36 pages) is devoted to facts and figures plus information about organisations with little perspective on the propriety and relevance of this. Given the understandable approach of keeping the document relatively short, it can be argued that this is a missed opportunity. Unfortunately there are too many examples of the difficulties faced in relation to the fundamental strategic management challenge posed in the Guide, such as the “gap filling issue”, discussed above. In a similar vein, a next key basic is ensuring that appropriate methods are adopted for reaching those most in need. Yet how best to deliver emergency responses is an issue that the most experienced and well-resourced organisations have difficulties with; in particular how to properly engage with local organisations.

For instance, a UN (United Nations) and OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) led initiative, for both the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes Region, is currently being advanced (launched in 2004). At the time of writing it is focused on collaboration and communication between organizations during emergencies and is taking into account the critical link between building national and local capacities for response so that emergency responses effectively developed. This work will develop risk information, contingency planning and early warning systems and span the timeframe from disaster response to post disaster recovery through to sustainable development. The initiative has emphasized the value of involving communities and their representative bodies from the outset and in the subsequent delivery of responses; also, one of its propositions is that even in large-scale catastrophes, where the UN through OCHA intervenes, far more lives are saved through national and local actions, than through international teams. Conveying the essence and key details of such important work at the international level in the Guide would be helpful to grantmakers.
Linking disaster grantmaking to long-term development work?

Thirdly, the Guide would be considerably strengthened both by providing greater insight into what constitutes a disaster, and by exploring – or at least acknowledging how this thinking fits into the range of responses that a grant maker might consider; for instance, in an international development context, the support of long-term sustainable development programmes. These matters are often at the heart of what organisations deeply involved with this type of work have to wrestle with. In the first place there are the challenges of assessing the propriety of separating out a disaster from longer-term considerations in any case. Dovetailing with this, how a strategic and longer-term perspective can be maintained even in the face of increasingly acute short-term considerations. McEntire’s work above (op.cit), exploring the diverse theories of development as applied to the study of disaster, considers the benefits of integration of thinking in the radical and conservative ideological camps. This integration - simply put in practical terms - in many ways translates to organisations like Concern Universal attempt to responding to disasters and emergencies in a developmental way. The following case study demonstrates some of the intricacies that can be involved and how a broader understanding of the developmental realities, especially concerning communities rights and needs, can be vital in shaping disaster responses; as well as how a definitions of disaster are enhanced with the incorporation of the developmental perspective.

Case Study: Malawi, Southern Africa

Malawi is currently at the verge of potentially facing a serious situation regarding the 2005/2006 season due in part to several weeks dry spell that hit the country in the months of February and March 2005, as well as reduced uptake of inputs such as fertiliser due to input scarcity and higher prices beyond the means of many Malawians. The dry spell hit the crop stand at a stage when water requirements for all crops - especially, maize - were very critical. Whilst estimates naturally vary at this point, the latest Government / Famine Early Warning System assessment results indicate that the harvest will yield ~1.3 million metric tonnes of maize compared with last year’s final crop assessment of 1.7million metric tonnes. Other important crops to Malawi are expected to have varying degrees of success including pulses and millet with expected increase of 12% each compared with last year’s harvest and tobacco - the most important export earner to Malawi - and sweet potatoes with expected reduction of 13% each compared with last year’s harvest.

However, underlying factors contributing to this situation need to be considered; these are likely to be generally consistent with the findings from the previous high profile emergency (2002/2003). Given the learning that has been distilled from the last major crisis in Malawi and other countries in Southern Africa – for instance, DCI [Development Co-operation Ireland] DEC [Disasters Emergencies Committee] evaluations refer - there seems broad consensus that there was: (i) significant and strong debate about the nature and scale of the problem at the outset (which could well occur again this year); (ii) that because of delays, deaths and hardship occurred that could have been avoided if a more prompt and effective response had taken place; (iii) that, notwithstanding this, the short term response was generally found to be effective though (iv) the medium to longer term response was viewed to be less successful. Key factors that contributed towards the circumstances, and a less than optimally effective response, included: (i) an acute food shortage; (ii) endemic poverty; (iii) the impact of HIV/AIDS; (iv) a poor understanding of cultural context, and (iv) a relatively weak strategic analysis of the situation.

Accordingly, it is helpful to preface any immediate analysis by stating the importance for all actors to refine a clear strategic overview of the factors contributing to the current situation, and not only the obvious problems of poor rainfall and resulting crop harvest implications. In particular, to consider the propriety of any “traditional” emergency responses emerging in the context of how these link and dovetail with ongoing and new emergency preparedness, rehabilitation and sustainable development programmes in the areas affected.
The above helps demonstrate that there are no simple or fast solutions to ensuring that grantmakers make effective decisions in disaster situations. Effectiveness will ideally involve a long term, holistic and “helicopter vision” understanding of a situation combined with an in depth appreciation of community realities and needs. Also an awareness of appropriate means of facilitating positive change without duplicating resources, creating dependency, undermining long term sustainability and so on. Indeed, it could be argued that without setting out some of the long term developmental complexities involved - for instance, the underlying potential implications of issues like chronic poverty, gender and HIV/AIDS (highlighted in the case study) - the Guide is doing a disservice that might lead to harm being done - thus not achieving the first principle!

Developments in parallel with and post the Guide

Global developments

A number of developments, both globally and nationally based, provide both foreground and background to this paper; with clear implications for any further review of the Guide. On a global scale, for instance, three further internationally led and collaborative projects have relevance and could helpfully be cited. The first is the Disaster Relief Code of Conduct, begun in 1994. The second is the Sphere Project, launched in 1997 - its handbook ‘The Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response’, published after the Guide, in 2003. The third is The ‘Good Humanitarian Donor initiative’, launched in Stockholm in June 2003, with representatives from donor governments, UN agencies, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and other organisations involved with humanitarian action. Within these and other developments, which can only be described very briefly, some cross-referencing to disaster grantmaking seems essential.

(i) The Code of Conduct for Disaster Relief

The year 2004 marked the tenth anniversary of the ‘Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief’. With 304 signatories, the Code is being used increasingly for evaluation purposes, for example in a review in 2001 of the Gujerat earthquake response by the UK Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) Vaux (cited by Hilhorst, 2004) noted “in using the Code evaluators found it a more effective and challenging tool than they had expected”. In research conducted by the Disaster Studies group, Wageningen University, the Netherlands, for an international conference on the Code’s value and possible future, the implicit rather than explicit use of the Code in humanitarian practice was emphasised: “many colleagues are living illustrations of the principles; they don’t quote the principles, the principles are part of them” (Hilhorst, op. cit.,1). Appendix 1 provides a summary of these principles, from Hilhorst (ibid.) In reporting on “revived interest in the Code”, Hilhorst and colleagues explore critical possibilities, including the Code as a regulator (“where articles should be binding”) and thus as a basis for complaint “where beneficiaries should be able to use the Code …to complain about poor aid provision”(see also Hilhorst, 2004A).
(ii) The Sphere Project

The ‘Sphere Project’ – so named to emphasise ‘globality’ and be memorable – began among a group of international NGOs’ operational and policy people, originally as a ‘Standards Project’ (Walker and Purdin, 2004, 103). By 2003, a piloting process of the Humanitarian Charter and its standards was completed, undertaken by twenty international and local non-governmental organisations and networks; and an independent evaluation took place in 2004 (Young and Harvey, 2004, 99). As a major and continuing achievement on an international scale, any detailed commentary on these developments is clearly beyond the scope of this paper.

Six papers in volume 28(2) of the Disasters journal are devoted to this initiative, aimed at improving the effectiveness and accountability of humanitarian assistance. These papers explore Sphere’s rapid growth, tensions and achievements; the impact of the ‘manuals’ developed as an integral part of the work; and the sense of its value “in how people choose to use it, to serve the humanitarian organisation or to serve the victims of war and disaster” (Walker and Purdin, ibid, 111). Examining the ‘history of attempts to build humanitarian norms and standards’ Walker and Purdin summarise a tension that applies equally to the grantmaking world: “the tension between conviction-driven social action and studied professionalism, with its' standards, systems and accountabilities has energised humanitarianism since its founding” (ibid, 101).

Without more in-depth review, it is unclear whether there were any links between the Sphere network and the Guide’s sponsors at any time, but a limited comparison between the two suggests not; and points to a review and incorporation where appropriate of Sphere tenets in any subsequent Guide revision (Sphere, 2005).

This in itself raises further questions as to the implicit guiding philosophy of the Guide, as a ‘needs based’ approach to disaster response. The Sphere project is emphatically ‘rights-based’: “Sphere is based on two core beliefs: first that all possible steps should be taken to alleviate human suffering arising out of calamity and disaster and second, that those affected by disaster have a right to life with dignity and therefore a right to assistance” (Sphere, 2005).

(iii) The Good Humanitarian Donor Initiative

This emphasises the widest possible perspective being taken on donor behavior, and seeks to lay the foundations for good donorship. Like the Sphere Project, it has implications far wider than grantmaking per se but much of this thinking may be thought appropriate also to underpin disaster grantmaking values and practices. Its key focus is the work of donor governments.

The inset below sets out elements from the Initiative’s principles and provides some comment on these (source Macrae and Harmer, 2005):
The Good Humanitarian Donor Initiative

Principles

(i) Respect and promote the implementation of international humanitarian law, refugee law and human rights.
(ii) Allocate humanitarian funding in proportion to needs and on the basis of needs assessments.
(iii) Request implementing humanitarian organisations to ensure, to the greatest possible extent, adequate involvement of beneficiaries in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian response.
(iv) Good practice in donor financing, management and accountability.

Macrae and Harmer (1995) comment that there were difficulties in the text around the notion of burden sharing – one donor emphasised the need to see this in relation to the totality of humanitarian needs, not in relation to any particular situation. Also many participants agreed that, in particular, the identified practices in learning and accountability were narrow in scope and weak in relation to specific practice.

Key Points Endorsed

(i) An agreement to strive to ensure that the funding of humanitarian action in new crises does not adversely affect ongoing crises.
(ii) An agreement to encourage regular evaluations of international responses to humanitarian crises, including assessments of donor performance.
(iii) A commitment to ensure a high degree of accuracy, timeliness and transparency in donor reporting on official humanitarian assistance spending and to encourage the development of standardised formats for such reporting.
(iv) Whilst stressing the importance of transparent and strategic priority setting and financial planning by implementing organisations, explore the possibility of reducing, or enhancing the flexibility of earmarking and of introducing longer term funding arrangements.

As Macrae and Harmer (2005) note, a number of participants at the Stockholm meeting expressed concern that the conclusions did not go far enough – that they were the timid “squeak of a mouse rather than the roar of a lion”. It could be reasoned that a similar metaphor might be extended to the ‘Guide’?

They reasoned that the meeting was a major milestone in that it established the humanitarian agenda as a subset of aid policy and created shared, commonly held objectives for, and a definition of, humanitarian action, as well as a set of general principles and good practice for good donorship (Macrae and Harmer, 2005).

Subsequent progress on Good Humanitarian Donorship is extensive and continuing. The Canadian government hosting in Ottawa in October 2004 of the second international meeting on the Good Humanitarian Donorship emphasised the extent to which “Good Humanitarian Donorship is a long term agenda which seeks to promote greater accountability and consistency in donor government responses to crises” (Foreign Affairs Canada, 2004). One could reason that the over-riding perspective here is a needs-based approach.

National level developments – changing and flexible organizational structures?

At a national level, there are examples of important administrative or organizational and multi-organisational responses to disaster grantmaking that have something to offer in thinking about
organizational practice and appropriate (if not necessarily ‘fast’) response. Whilst it may be a commonplace in the NGO world to value collaborative and joint working, how is this played out in a disaster grantmaking context?

(i) The DEC – not a grantmaker but with relevant learning for grantmakers?

In the UK, the ‘Disasters Emergency Committee’ is an umbrella organization, set up by a group of aid agencies “which launches and co-ordinates the UK’s National Appeal in response to major disasters overseas” (DEC, 2005). Whilst not a grantmaking body per se, but with a wider mission to unite leading humanitarian agencies “in their efforts to maximize income from the British public” in such situations (DEC 2005a), this organization has a key element to its work - the commitment of its member agencies. Thus, this is not only to work together on national appeals, rather “to be jointly and individually accountable for the expenditure of funds raised”(DEC 2004). The accountability aspect being raised here by DEC, and followed through with its rigorous approach to evaluation of its work, has important messages for disaster grantmakers also.

(ii) The September 11th Fund – a unique grantmaking initiative?

A more specific and challenging development can be cited concerning the practice of two major members of the New York philanthropic and services community, in response to 9/11. This is the creation of a wholly new – and short-life - major grantmaking body in New York from a unique collaboration of two contrasting types of nonprofits, as a sectoral response to the 9/11 events. This grantmaker made its final report, in December 2004. This paper is able only briefly to draw attention to these developments, where they relate to the principles and thinking behind the Guide. There is a growing academic and practitioner literature elsewhere which is scrutinizing philanthropic responses in this context. (See for example Seessel, 2002).

In the wake of 9/11, academic and practitioner disasters literature increasingly incorporates a focus on terrorism and its aftermath. (e.g., Perry and Lindell, 2003; Frnink et al 2004). Published prior to those events, the Guide does not of course reflect specifically on disaster grantmaking in those circumstances, where it may be argued that the paradoxical pressures to act with compassion and with detachment will be acute. In the press and business journals, emphasis on grantmaker pressures has included the need to ensure that these organisations are ‘understood’ both by the donating public and would-be grantees. For example, the account of the work of the (volunteer) chief executive of the 9/11 United Services Group, aptly entitled “The Sorrow and the Purse Strings”, records that “the toughest part of …the job is rebuilding trust between charities and victims by cutting bureaucracy and improving communications”(Thornton, 2002.)

It would be fair to say that institutional or organisational structure-based decisions are rarely presented as the key to effective decisionmaking in these circumstances. In one striking instance however, this was the route of part of the philanthropic community response in New York, the creation of a new limited–life organisation for grantmaking purposes, derived from joint work between two major grantmaking players with differing skills, working together on a new wide brief, and with a commitment to complete its work. The ‘September 11th Fund’ formed on the initiative of
the New York Community Trust and the United Way of New York City, on 9/11 drawing its contributions from money given to those two organisations, but operating with an independent board and staff, for a limited time period to maximise its effectiveness. The Fund closed on 31 December 2004. Appendix 2 sets out its key elements.

Whether this structural model of collaborative working by disaster grantmakers can be re-created, let alone become a norm or benchmark remains to be seen. As a hybrid grantmaker, fully independent yet with clear parents offering differing kinds of expertise, as a kind of temporary working merger for the ‘emergency’ element of the disaster work, the approach avoids criticisms of the ‘yet another organisation’ kind. By signalling a planned demise, the approach exemplifies the ‘phased’ nature of disaster response, discussed earlier; but may also raise questions as to which if any organisations then respond in turn, and how a developmental grantmaking approach can be achieved. At the same time, this approach may be seen as a function of the proximity of the disaster concerned, drawing comparatively on Barton’s (2003, 33) exploration of disaster and collective stress, and the effects of disasters in remote places “which do not create direct contact with victims”.

Reflections and Conclusion

A series of conclusions may be drawn and reflections presented.

As an important and innovative work, the Guide’s limitations are not only those associated with the occurrence of subsequent events, such as the Good Humanitarian Donor Initiative or the temporary-independence modelling of two senior organisations, pooling expertise that might have been difficult to anticipate at the time. However, as a first step, since the Guide was prepared in 2001, any new edition could usefully revisit the eight principles, in the light of continuing debates and new grantmaking practice, to assess the extent to which these reflect the developing consensus internationally. For instance, one principle absent from the list of eight set out is that grant makers, through whatever type of initiative and organisation they choose to support, do their best to ensure that communities have been involved in the design of the initiative, continuing to be involved throughout implementation stages; thus, existing coping mechanisms of communities need to be respected and supported by grantmakers. Also, with respect to the eight principles, there is little or no mention of the impact or harm disasters can have on host communities and how this can be dealt with.

The Guide could go on to give a practical helping hand to translating the principles it advocates - or for that matter of the Sphere project and any other such standards that grantmakers may come across – into the realities that they will face when making a decision on limited information, especially in terms of what is acceptable or not acceptable: for instance, whilst all operational agencies in a given situation may aspire to achieving key standards, the on the ground situation may mean that capacity, contextual realities and basic practicalities may lead even the larger organisations to fail to reach the standards. A key issue may then become the degree to which the organisations requesting grants have integrated the standards into their overall approach strategically and how this will impact on the particular operational approaches that they are proposing.
Following Drucker’s (1954) challenge to management of ‘joining up the whole’, it would be useful for the Guide to join the pieces (the 8 principles) of the jigsaw puzzle to describe to grant makers an overall vision for effective grant making. For instance, the principle of community involvement in determining and responding to need coherently links with other existing principles in the Guide: such as that grant makers maximise the value of local organisations already working in the areas affected by the disaster.

In developing and recasting the Guide, it would be useful to state clearly the target group(s) for the Guide, acknowledging different needs, constraints and opportunities for these audiences: for instance, some grant makers have stretched capacity, no specialist knowledge about disaster grant making, yet within their charitable objects include disaster grant making. Increased background about the practical options for making grants and the pros and cons of these options – especially in terms of in depth analysis and examples of good practice - would be helpful in general and specifically relating to the different target groups. Without being prescriptive, this would enable grant makers to make more informed analysis of the risks involved of following different paths and assist them in reaching effective decisions.

For instance, many practitioners would reason that internationally insufficient resources are devoted to disaster mitigation or preparedness activities, relative to disaster response in particular, yet these could be contested to be relatively highly effective and a low risk area of contribution for certain target grantmaking groups to engage with. Furthermore, practitioners would often make the case for allocating grants to “forgotten emergencies” and perhaps specialising in these. Finally, for grantmakers to consider the propriety of the argument for developing relationships and knowledge of certain geographical areas so that they are well equipped with contextual understanding and effective channels to respond when a particular disaster strikes (i.e., rather than feeling compelled to respond to every situation that arises internationally).

It may be that, rather than revision, a new form of Guide, in the form of the creation of a practical toolkit for effective disaster grant making and response might be appropriate, tailored to relevant and main target groups. A model might be the voluntary sector strategy toolkit (Copeman et al, 2004) with a starting point the development of a strategic management concept for disaster grant making and response; and then setting out planning tools to cascade from this. To be effective it could be reasoned that this would need to holistic in outlook and take into account plus meet the needs of different target groups of grant makers. Once created the toolkit would be a valuable instrument and solid foundation for advocating best practice.

While there is a case for having a specialist toolkit like this, it would be very important in principle, given learning and experience over the years, to continually look through the prism of longer-term developmental and social programmes, especially how short term actions dovetail as effectively as possible with these. This leads naturally into another area in which the Guide could be strengthened: to provide greater insight into the relationships that can and need to be effectively fostered between grant makers and grant recipients, including advice on how to avoid the key
issue of dependency arising and more positively the propriety of developing strategic partnership approaches.

Neal’s (2001,24) review of Quarantelli’s edited work “What is a Disaster? Perspectives on the Question” explores the thinking of those contributors who argue that “dissensus in defining disaster exists and dissensus is necessary”. In particular he examines the case made for reformulation; that is that the question should not be ‘what is a disaster?’ but ‘how is disaster...’ From this perspective, responding to the question ‘how is disaster grantmaking best pursued’, leads to emphasis on strategy as well as operational practice.

Even if the distinctive academic literature only emerged in the US in the early twentieth century, deciding about how to use limited resources in disaster situations is an ancient strategic management challenge and learning and experiences can be drawn on from long ago. The issues faced today by grant makers are not new, though every specific situation has unique elements. Moreover, it can be reasoned that the development of civilisation itself is in part a response to dealing with or avoiding disaster: in Ponting’s (1991) Green History of the World, he points out how the first civilisations – in Mesopotamia, the Indus Valley and China, for instance - emerged through creating a surplus of food that facilitated people to move away from a less certain, day to day existence; this enabled them to avoid or be more resilient in the face of disasters. The extent to which this produces a community approach or a professionalizing approach can then be debated.

The conceptualization of a distinctive and generic strategic management approach in disaster situations could helpfully reference historical and wider cross cultural and international insights into the scope of what is involved and how understanding is shaped. It is concluded this would be a useful avenue for further research insofar as the scope offered is so extensive.2

From this exploratory paper, what remains to be investigated includes two key areas - firstly the extent to which there can said to be a notion of disaster grantmaking as such, when the wider development issues and the experience of what makes a ‘disaster’ are still in debate. Secondly how this developing work can be said to contribute to grantmaking theory. What does seem clear – and what the Guide exemplifies – is the overarching approach of professionalism, and of learning from ‘experts’.

2 Navigating through this is not straightforward: as an illustration of this, one could consider a headline in the Independent “The Final Proof - Global Warming is a Man Made disaster” (19th February 2005), and the concerns raised in the following article about addressing this international potential disaster issue. There is also Roberts’ (2004) contention, from a study of ‘World History’, that mankind’s growing ability to have greater control over the environment – thus avoiding disaster – may well enable it to work itself out of difficulties in the face of Global Warming or indeed other potential twenty first century disasters as it has previously overcome major issues or acute predictions over the centuries. With respect to Climate chance he references how communities previously dealt effectively with the last Ice Age or cites how people have been able to rebuff Malthus’s [1798] theory which predicted that food supply would not keep up with population growth.
To a great extent this is mirrored in Bird’s book review of “Disasters and the American Red Cross in Disaster Relief”, published and reviewed in 1918. Her account of this “little book” could be taken as apt for the Guide itself:

“Mr Deacon offers a handbook – a suggestive compilation of fact and principle..with well chosen case stories and a summary of the principles applied or evolved.

Though the reiteration of these principles may seem unduly insistent to the professional workers, it serves to fix them in the mind of the layman and suggests rather adroitly the wisdom of calling on the Red Cross, with its wealth of experience, trained workers and ability to offer expert advice rather than attempting to meet a great emergency with local organizations alone, however willing and devoted they may be” (Bird, 1918,11).

This approach to professionals as experts and the relative role of locals and locality is one which may still seem compelling to many Western and Northern grantmakers. However, it is one which the international development community, (especially where it moves to a rights based rather than needs based approach to disaster response) is challenging, in the context of disaster grantmaking.

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**Appendix One: Summary of Key Principles of the Code of Conduct on Disaster Relief.**

*Abstracted from Hilhorst (2004, op.cit)*

“The Code accommodates different approaches to humanitarian aid. The first four articles concern the fundamental humanitarian principles of

- humanity
- impartiality
- neutrality, and
- independence,

albeit in a weaker form than the original Red Cross principles.

The other six principles give directions on how aid should be given and are inspired by more development-oriented perspectives. They concern:

- respecting local culture
- accountability
- the long term reduction of vulnerability
- collaboration with local partners
- participation
- and the representation of disaster-affected people in the media.”
The NY Community Trust and the United Way of New York “each have long and proud histories and very different organizational cultures and traditions” (p.9). NYCT had “80 years of working with donors and making grants to nonprofits”; United Way NYC was “effective in collecting donations from the public and businesses and working in community agencies” (p.16) In joining together they did “something truly extraordinary; they assigned grantmaking authority for more than half a billion dollars contributed to the Fund to an independent Board of directors and staff”.(p.9)The Fund “would solicit donations on an ongoing basis...its administrative expenses would not be taken from donations and it would spend down its resources over a finite period of time and then go out of business”.(p.10)

Not knowing “what the nature and magnitude of the issues would be”, the mandate was made deliberately broad; with acknowledgement of the effort needed to “transcend the cultures and operating methods” of the two organisations, whilst “not wanting to create a new non-profit ”.(p.16) For the first C we had to hire staff, negotiate space, prepare our new board for decisions they would make, learn quickly about the victims, what was already been done,where the gaps were and design new grant programs to fill them, All at once”.(p.19). “Hardest was deciding how to help...our donors were broadminded as they were generous ...(For the media)...the unprecedented help ..provided by charities quickly ceased to be “news”; instead they wanted scandal and for a while no accusation seemed too far fetched.”(p.30).

Grantmaking is described as “unconventional” – with staff seeking organisations that could respond professionally, reliably and accountably; sometimes funding nonprofits in different places, setting common standards, sometimes funding several in the same place (to offer victims a choice),“sometimes funded a non-profit, contracting with business to provide help efficiently...”(p.30). For the Fund, at 1.12.04, $534 million was collected; $528 million distributed in grants; 559 grants were made: 85% in cash assistance and services for victims and families,13% in assistance to communities,2% in rescue and recovery efforts. 100,000 people received cash assistance, including 3,800 surviving families and severely injured, 35,000 with lost jobs, and 6,000 displaced from their homes.

In establishing deadlines for closing, the Fund sought to give grantees “adequate notice and time to prepare- but not so long that it prolongs their anxiety about closing”(p.52), and directed unspent monies to be used solely for 9/11 related services. A smaller ‘closeout’ committee is overseeing any “loose ends”. The remaining balance of funds will continue as a distinct programme within NYCT until all monies are disbursed.

The recollections of some of those who founded and administered the Fund are recorded by the September 11 Oral History Project, at Columbia University. Program records and grant files (not personal client data) will be archived at the New York Public Library and open to researchers in 2021.